Proposal for a Subject Architecture Based on the Concept of "Attribution", Using Imagination as a Virtual Space

Co-authorship The fundamental ideas of this article were developed between 2002 and 2005 and registered in the National Library of Uruguay in 2005 by Fernando Máximo Marichal Martínez and Carlos Daniel Tellechea Heguaburo under the name "Theory of the Intersubject". The present is a reformulation carried out in 2025 by Carlos Daniel Tellechea Heguaburo.

Body

Imagine an abstract unit.

Assign the name "A" to the imaginary abstract unit.

The imaginary abstract unit, to be a unit, must necessarily be separation, opposition, and limit. Since the abstract unit can only be imagined, created through reason, we will also call it a "rational unit". It does not exist outside of reason; things exist as units, but not the abstract unit itself. Separation is the most fundamental existence of analysis: analysis is separation.

To create the abstract unit in your imagination, you must necessarily differentiate (separate) it from something; you have created a limit. That something different from **A** is **non-A**. **A|non-A** or **non-A|A** is the limit of both **A** and **non-A**. The names "A" and "non-A" would be strictly interchangeable: the inside could be **A**, but it could also be the outside, as long as the other end of the relationship held the opposite name; if the inside were **A**, the outside would be **non-A**; if the inside were **non-A**, the outside would be **A**. Any continuous or self-intersecting line that absolutely separates two areas on a plane would serve to graphically express the limit in two dimensions.

Imagine that **A** possessed an internal structure.

Imagine that **A** divided into two parts.

Imagine that one part of **A** was an information producer.

Imagine that the other part of **A** was an information repository. We will call the information-producing device the "attributive apparatus" and the information it generates "attribution product". We will call the information storage device (of attribution products) the "background theory". We will call the functioning of the attributive apparatus "attribution process". Imagine that these two parts functioned in coordination: the attributive apparatus could only create information based on what existed in the background theory, while the background theory could only exist if fed by the attributive apparatus.

Imagine a universe in which there existed only two variants of abstract units: variant 1 would not possess the internal division between attributive apparatus and background theory; variant 2 would possess it. In the Theory of the Intersubject, we have called variant 1 of the rational unit an "object", and variant 2 a "subject". Only subjects would possess a background theory and an attributive apparatus. Regarding the attributive apparatus/background theory structure, it must still be said that the storage of information might not be exclusive to subjects, but rather we might ask whether any modification

of matter as a reaction to an action should be judged as information storage; a stone that receives a blow shows damage, and that damage is information the stone has stored. The attributive apparatus might be the only true characteristic of the subject, as the ability to create information embodies, for human beings, the manifestation of a will, which is a driving force we identify with a vital impulse. Strictly speaking, every subject obeys the abstract structure of a "set of properties limited", which is the most evident definition of an "object". But within its properties are the attributive apparatus and the background theory.

Now imagine that two rational subject units in their background theory shared information x. Those two subjects would form an intersubject in relation to that information x, which is the field of the intersubject. The intersubject is a relationship between subjects based on a joint attribution.

It is always essentially about the rational unit **A**, but when duplicated, we must name it to differentiate it. Thus, we will have unit **A1** and unit **A2**. **A1** and **A2** form an intersubject in x.

Regarding x, **A1** and **A2** are one subject, although since we know their background theory contains more than x, we call them "intersubject".

Reality is supported by a floating field of intersubjects.

Case Study

Presentation. The study of cases allows us to test the validity of the theory as an explanatory framework for concrete situations. Generally, in the presentation of a case, we will find a presenter or someone responsible for the presentation; they are a subject and, as such, possess a charge in their background theory. At the other end is the one who understands the presented case; they are the spectator of the case. The subject's charge consists of the attribution products in their background theory. The case presenter and the case spectator interact through the case and the way it is presented and understood.

Case 1. Presenter: A person who believes that the Earth is flat comes before us. You and I know they are mistaken, but that person is convinced that the Earth is flat. If reality depends on the association between subjects in intersubjects, does the Earth become flat when that person talks with their friends who think like them? It is absurd.

Review. The presenter’s conclusion is correct: it is absurd to think that the shape of the planet Earth changes according to how subjects think. But that is information in our background theory. Information that we possibly share, forming an intersubject. On the other hand, the presenter shares with the case spectator that the Earth is not flat, which makes us immediately understand that the flat-earther is mistaken. When that person converses with a friend who believes the same, they will both be wrong. This happens because both the presenter and the case spectator possess a charge and judge according to that intersubjective charge against the flat-earther. Since I, as the case evaluator, also possess a charge, I can say that no matter how they intersubjectively link, the character will be mistaken and the Earth will not change shape.

Case 2. Presenter: For millions of years, dinosaur fossils remained buried. When people were unaware of them, they could not even imagine that dinosaurs had existed. So, did they not exist? Then, suddenly, did they begin to exist?

Review. We know that fossils are the skeletal remains of an extinct fauna. This is information contained in our background theory. This means that when we contrast this information with the idea that dinosaurs began to exist only when we discovered their bones, the idea seems absurd. Therefore, once again, we find that the intersubjective charge determines the judgment.

Case 3. Presenter: If something happens and there are no witnesses, does it really happen? Because if an intersubjective relationship is needed to support it, then the unknown event does not occur.

Review. The presenter has stated in the presentation that something (the "unknown event") has occurred. By denying the existence of witnesses, they contradict their own initial statement since they are themselves a witness. If we believe them, we form an intersubject with them in the field /something happens/. If we intersubjectively validate with them the field /there are no witnesses/, we fall into contradiction along with the presenter. The natural response is, "yes, it really happens even if no one has witnessed it", but the truth is that we are trusting the presenter and their implicit testimony. By forming an intersubject with them in the field /something happens/, we cannot later go against that very field. /Something happens/ and /there are no witnesses/ are contradictory fields unless we believe that the presenter is a being that is simultaneously inside and outside of reality (knows that something happened but is not a witness and was not told about it because there were no witnesses).

Case 4.

Scientific Discourse, Its Validation, and the Criterion of Objectivity

Scientific findings must be validated by peers (intersubjective review). That is, the ability to reproduce an experiment regulates the acceptance of knowledge into the general body of science. The intersubjective relationship is a prerequisite for the objective relationship.

Presenter: When a scientific discovery occurs, its objectivity is guaranteed by the control exercised by the community, which cannot refuse to recognize that, regardless of the tastes, thoughts, or feelings of the researcher, the presented theory is confirmed by the facts. If it is not confirmed, then the theory is incorrect.

The community is obliged to validate objectively true knowledge.

Review. Intersubjectivity and objectivity are two sides of the same coin; two ways of referring to the same thing. If we are part of an intersubject validating a scientific discovery, we will call it an "objective fact", and the abstract explanation that predicts and integrates it into a rational scheme a "true theory". In reality, these are intersubject fields that receive our validation. From within the quantitative base of the intersubject (the community that validates a field), the field in question (the qualitative base of the intersubject) is "objective".

Judgment regarding the error of a community concerning widely accepted knowledge at a particular moment in history, for example, the belief that the Earth was the center of the universe, is only possible by situating ourselves in another intersubject, that is, in a community that possesses a conflicting value in its background theory.

Case 5. Presenter: A person is diagnosed with a terminal illness. This person refuses to accept the fact that they will die and consults multiple specialists. The diagnosis is confirmed. They then begin a strict regimen of alternative medicine: herbs, stones, eliminating certain foods, meditation, acupuncture. If reality were entirely dependent on shared subjective beliefs, that is, intersubjectivity, then this person would not be ill and would not die. Or, if they accepted the illness but believed in alternative therapies, they should be saved.

The patient dies.

Review. The case presenter establishes an initial piece of information that remains active throughout the case: the terminal diagnosis. They then reinforce this field with consultations from multiple doctors and the confirmation of the diagnosis. Finally, they provide the fact that the patient has died. Since all these fields belong to intersubjects we are part of, how could we accept that the patient was not ill simply because they did not believe in their illness? Furthermore, the fact of death also reinforces the idea that alternative medicine was ineffective, which resonates with our belief —possibly shared— that such treatments are not effective at all. The discrediting of alternative medicine, which is also an inter-subject, connects to the case.

The Problem of Field Exclusion and the Necessary Declaration of the Self in Analysis

It may seem trivial, but it really is not. In all informal criticisms that the Theory of the Intersubject has received, the problem of field exclusion appears in some form. It is striking that even people who might be respected for their intelligence have fallen into such a simple trap.

Either the trap is not so simple, or people are not as intelligent.

If the case spectator is asked to accept a certain field, then they should not be asked to ignore it later. For example, if the case presenter asks us to imagine that something false is believed by a community, they initially present it as false, and we enter their quantitative base validating that field. When they later ask us to ignore it, they are demanding the exclusion of that field from the body of fields we jointly validate with other subjects. This is field exclusion.

What is objective is then subtly identified with the opposite position of the false field, resulting in the impossibility of refusing to accept it.

About the concepts of "range", "reversibility of relation", and "reversed analogy" (creation of the analogem)

It is important to note that, during the development of the framework that Fernando Marichal and I called "Theory of the Intersubject" twenty years ago, adjustments and additions were made that help to understand the process of logical validation that we carry out. Three of the most important concepts developed in the background of the construction, which guide this construction, are "range", "reversibility of relation", and "reversed analogy".

The notion of range points out the importance of a domain within which certain properties may exist, or certain conditions are met. This domain is arbitrarily delimited, and it is appropriate to associate it with the establishment of absolute limits. Regarding the absolute limit, it is important to clarify that the idea of a non-absolute limit is a secondary development of the attributive apparatus itself, which can do two opposite things simultaneously; on one hand, it can break the world into discrete, manageable units; on the other, it can recognize that rational separations are nothing but an arbitrary overlapping of surfaces.

Range is important because it helps us understand how it is possible, for example, to observe a joint attribution in two different subjects. Rationally, we know that this is impossible. And it is because two attributions can never be identical in two different environments. What is possible —and this is how things work— is that there exists a range in which we identify an equality between distinct attributions. By not exceeding the range, we talk about "joint attribution". This adjustment is indispensable because, in language, human beings equate experiences that must necessarily be distinct.

Also, note the importance of semantic change, the idiomatic shift, which is pushed by the epistemological foundation on which a theoretical development as an abstract explanation is based. Semantic change will inevitably affect all references to prior discourses. When we quote an author or lightly refer to what "such theory would assert", it is an irresponsible act because, unknowingly, we traffic information belonging to its epistemological foundation; that is, its fundamental assertions about reality, truth, and being.

That said, when I say the following: "things work this way", I am making a demand for joint attribution towards you. A demand that you can either accept or reject. If you accept it, you would enter into an intersubjective relationship with me. If you reject it, you would understand that my logic contains errors.

The deep and powerful reason for the importance of the notion of range is that equality is only possible in an imaginary reality, for example, in the world of value (two hundred peso bills are equal in their value, and it is the same whether the hundred pesos are paid with one bill of one hundred or with two bills of fifty, or with five of twenty, or with ten of ten; the value is the same). But two real entities cannot be equal by principle. If they were, they would be one. Someone dear to us gives us a hundred-peso bill from a country they visited. It is not the same to have that bill as to have another one given to us by someone else, even though they have the same value. It is not the same bill.

The reversibility of relation is one of the ideas that has seemed to me the most beautiful and surprising in the development of the theory. It involves a deep reflection on the mechanisms of reality creation based on the grouping of clues under the mantle of an absolute limit.

The most graphic way I've found to exemplify the reversibility of relation (though it should be noted that the reversibility of relation is the abstract concept that explains the phenomenon in the example and others, meaning it is deeper than a mere visual curiosity) is the case of the shadow. If we place an object between a light source and a wall, we will have its shadow projected onto the wall, but we will also have projected on the wall the absence of light emitted by the source. If we place a hand between the light source and the wall and then close and reopen it, we may notice that the shadow can be interpreted in two ways: either the back of the hand is facing the observer, or the palm of the hand is facing the observer. The same happens with drawings that can be interpreted in more than one way and that constitute associative exercises.

The image is reversible because it is possible to interpret the position of the hand in two different ways. This is so because the clues we have make our brain have to make a decision; a decision that is not exhausted by the clues but is an intellectual act governed by will. A thought scheme, as we will see, can be reversed without problems, and this reversal can lead to subsequent developments.

If we have a group of clues, these clues only make sense as such through the addition of others, which, when considered in total, make one interpretation more plausible than another. For example, we believe we have enough clues about the approximate sphericity of the Earth, but it would be enough to annul some clues for all the others to change direction and the relation to be reversed. In some cases, like the fantasy that we live in a simulation, the reversibility can be absolute since there is no way to prove the contrary. We deny it or fully affirm it in an act of faith. The same happens when we venerate God. The ad hoc adjustments to our interpretations of reality are nothing but additions that save the entire indexical structure.

It would also be the same, as we will see in the next article, to interpret an enigmatic otherness as a clue of an extraterrestrial presence that would explain human behaviors that could well be due to shyness, distrust, or contempt.

But without a doubt, the idea that takes the prize regarding its impact on the rational elaboration of a possible explanation about the creation of knowledge and reality is that of reversed analogy. As we will see, in order to understand it, the reversibility of relation must necessarily be used. Reversed analogy opens unexpected doors in the development of a new and beautiful intellectual landscape. This is because reversed analogy creates a new concept and, moreover, a category of special objects: the analogem.

When we perceive an analogy (it is more accurate, strictly speaking, to say "when we decide on an analogy"), we establish a relationship of similarity between the objects we will call "object A" and "object B"; and the objects are understood as sets of properties attributed in a background theory by

an attributive apparatus. Naturally, in order to coordinate them, we must also create a common domain: object C. But speaking exclusively of A and B, the properties of both as analogs are similar. This is what anyone using common sense would say. However, we point out that A and B share a certain body of attributed properties in common. These properties are fields of inter-object between A and B. The shared properties can be reified (i.e., understood as an entity: attributing them the character of an entity), and that entity can be named. Since we have reserved the name "C" for the domain, the common denominator entity could be called "object D." This object is an analogem, while A and B are analogs. The analogem is rational, like a number. It cannot be directly observed but in the thing.

The idea of "intersubject" is that of "interobject", but referred to analogems between subjects.

The analogy, then, has been reversed (reinterpreted). And the Theory of Intersubject in its entirety is an interpretive scheme of epistemological, gnoseological, and ontological nature, which arises and grows from the reversibility of relation applied to analogy. Not seeing the analogem is depriving oneself of an entire sector of reality.

The concept of reversibility of relation reappears forcefully when we try to understand the duality of intersubjectivity/objectivity and suddenly realize that it is the same thing named in two different ways. Objectivity and intersubjectivity are, then, reversible.

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As a conclusion to this article, I want to place it exactly where it should go. It should not be considered from a formal theoretical point of view, nor should it be regarded as a model for developing therapeutic relativisms or questioning moral principles. From the beginning, the intention of Marichal and myself was not that.

It is, above all, a game. A game in which there is no rival; a collaborative game of wit in which a challenge is proposed (who proposed it? How? Why to us?). The challenge consisted in the creation, starting from a radically original idea —that of a series of "floating fields" as the foundation of reality— of a reinterpretation of knowledge as abstraction. This idea necessarily opened the doors to revisiting the very concept of "subject" and assigning it a new architecture.